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M askin  and  R iley [1993] showed th a t  V ickrey’s well known 
R evenue E quivalence T heorem  no longer holds in p riva te  - in d e­
penden t value auctions w hen bidders are assum ed to  be a s y m m e t ­
ric and  provided sufficient conditions on th e  b u y ers’ d is trib u tio n s  
of values for th e  rank ing  of F irs t-  and Second-Price auc tions in 
te rm s of th e  seller’s expected  revenue. T he  pu rpose  of th e  presen t 
p ap e r is to  check w hether theore tica l p red ic tions concerning th e  
dom inance of second-price over first-price auc tions are  verified in 
a  lab o ra to ry  experim en t. R esu lts  show th a t  th e  suggested  ran k ­
ing  is no t verified on e ither a  full-sam ple basis or, once a  learn ing  
ac tiv ity  has been detec ted , on a  sub-sam ple basis.
*1 wish to thank Reinhard Selten and Ronald H arstad for helpful suggestions on 
the running of the experiment and John Riley for providing numerical simulations 
of the equilibrium bidding strategies in First-Price auctions. I am also indebted to 
Klaus Abbink and Abdolkarim Sadrieh for their comments and tim e spent on the 
programming of the experiment. Finally, I wish to thank Alan Kirm an, my thesis 
advisor, and Louis Phlips for their guidance. Financial support from the European 
University Institute and from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 303 






















































































































































































In this paper we present a laboratory analysis of some results recently 
reported in the literature on auction theory. This literature is usually 
thought of as stemming from Vickrey’s [1961] seminal paper where at­
tention was focused on four single unit auction institutions: the English, 
the Dutch, the First-Price Sealed Bid (FP) and the Second-Price Sealed 
Bid (SP) auctions. By considering these auctions as bidding games and 
by analysing their strategic forms, he stated the Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem (RET): these four auction institutions yield the same expected 
revenue to the seller. This result holds under a set of assumptions that 
are still considered as a benchmark in auction theory. These assumptions 
are:
1. The number of bidders participating in the auction is common 
knowledge,
2. Bidders are risk neutral,
3. Bidders are symmetric in the sense that they all draw their valua­
tions from the same distribution which is common knowledge,
4. Any one bidder’s valuation is statistically independent of any other 
bidder’s valuation. Valuations are then said to be private - inde­
pendent.
Part of subsequent research in auction theory focused on the im­
plications of relaxing one or more of these assumptions on the seller’s 
revenue and on bidders’ bidding behaviour (Matthews [1987], Cox et 
al. [1982][1985]and [1988], Milgrom and Weber [1982]). In this vein, 
Maskin and Riley [1993] — referred to as MR henceforth — relaxed the 
‘symmetric-bidders’ assumption and determined sufficient conditions on 
bidders’ distributions of valuations for the ranking of FP and SP auc­
tions in terms of the seller’s expected revenue. In fact, recalling that the 
dominant strategy in a SP auction (i.e.: to bid one’s valuation) is inde­



























































































relies on two possible strategic behaviours that a bidder should adopt in 
FP auctions when facing a particular type of opponent (the opponent’s 
type being defined by his distribution of valuations).
On one hand, when the asymmetry results because one buyer has a 
much higher probability of not bidding at all, it is the SP auction which 
dominates. This is due to the low-ball effect inherent to FP auctions: 
knowing that his opponent will not bid with a sufficiently high proba­
bility, a bidder should then submit a very low bid. On the other hand, 
when the asymmetry results because one buyer places sufficiently higher 
probability on high valuations then it is the FP auction that dominates. 
This is due to the sure thing effect or equivalently to the reluctance of the 
optimistic bidder (the one who has higher probability on high valuations) 
to take on risk by submitting lower bids.
Although both effects axe readily perceived in a simple example in­
volving atomic distributions, the predictions derived for continuous dis­
tributions are less intuitive. These theoretical insights remain nonethe­
less of considerable importance since they tackle one of the most realistic 
working assumptions and may to this extent explain why some auction 
formats are actually prefered by sellers to others.
Most of the auction literature that dealt with this assumption con­
sidered common-value auctions with, at the exception of Hausch [1987], 
the particular type of asymmetry resulting from the presence of some pro­
prietary information in a symmetric setting1. In such a framework, a bid­
der is said to have proprietary information when he detains additional pri­
vate information (such as on the true value of the item). Ortega-Reichert 
[1968] and Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. [1983] analysed the consequences 
of this pattern in a one-period FP auction and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Weber [1983] in sequential FP auctions.
JIn common value auction models, bidders need to  guess the true value (V) of the 
item to be sold. V  is assumed to  be drawn from a known probability distribution 
and bidders receive private signals tha t are independent and identically distributed, 
conditional on V.  In this respect, Hausch [1987] examines FP  and SP auctions where 





























































































The present paper reports on a series of experiments that repro­
duces MR’s conditions to observe the low-ball effect in FP auctions and 
the resulting theoretical dominance of SP auctions in terms of the seller’s 
expected revenue. Results show first that subjects did adopt significantly 
different strategies in SP auctions as they changed of competition envi­
ronment and second, while they did realize the strategic implications of 
asymmetric preferences in FP auctions, the expected dominance outcome 
was not observed. This being understood when the equilibrium bidding 
strategies in FP auctions are reconsidered from a feasibility point of view.
The following section spells out the theoretical framework and the 
assumptions underlying MR’s predictions. Section 3 describes the exper­
imental design. Results are given in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes 
the paper.
2 Theoretical framework
There are 2 risk neutral buyers (* =  1,2) competing for the purchase of 
a single item to be auctioned off. Each buyer i has private information 
concerning his own valuation Vi for the item, which is independently 
drawn from a non-degenerated c.d.f. Fj £ C1 with support [0; vt]. Both 
supports and distribution functions are common knowledge.
2.1 Equilibrium bidding strategies
Under the above assumptions, Vickrey’s [1961] well-known result with 
regards to the outcomes of SP and English auctions still remains valid. 
Indeed, despite the presence of asymmetries in bidders’ distributions of 
values, it is still a dominant strategy to submit bids equal to one’s val­
uation in SP auctions or to remain in the rising bidding process of an 
English auction until the last offer equals one’s valuation. In both auc­
tion institutions, if bidders play their dominant strategies, the winning 





























































































In FP auctions, the buyer who submitted the highest bid is awarded 
the item for a price equal to his bid. A buyer i with valuation Vi who 
obtains the item with a bid b earns a profit of u* — b. A pair of bid 
functions
b — Bi{v) and Bj(-) > 0, for « = 1,2 (1)
is then said to be an equilibrium if, for all feasible v, it is a best response 
for buyer i to adopt Bi(v) as his bidding strategy given that buyer j  
(j ^  i) bids Bj(v). Let v = <pi(b) denote the inverse function of £,•(•). 
That is, player i bids b when his valuation is <f>i(b) and wins if the other 
buyer bids less, that is if Vj < (j)j{b). Therefore, buyer Vs expected profit 
can be expressed as
Ui(v, b) = { v -  b W M b )) ,  for i #  j  = 1,2 (2)
For both bidders, since it is not worth bidding more then one’s com­
petitor’s maximum possible bid, there must exist some common maxi­
mum bid b. On the other hand, a buyer with a zero valuation will not 
submit a positive bid since if he did so and won the auction, he would 
incur a loss. Hence, the equilibrium inverse bid functions must satisfy
4(0 ) =  0 and Fi(<j>i(b)) — 1, fo ri =  1,2 (3)
4>i{h) and 4>j{b) can now be defined as being the solution of the 
following system of differential equations
<t>i(V)F\fo)<t>'2 -  f2(4)42 -  W 2) = 0
-  Fi(<t>i) =  0
satisfying the boundary conditions (3).
In what follows, buyer 1 will be assumed to be the more opti­
mistic buyer in the sense that his distribution of values, Fi(u) domi­





























































































Since it is a dominant strategy for both bidders to bid their own value, 
the theoretical expected revenue for the seller may be expressed as follows 
— Proposition 3.4 in MR -—:
Rs p = [  [1 -  Fi (x)]-£-[x (1 -  F2(x))]dx + f  [1 -  Fi(x)]xdF2(x)
Jo ax Jo
and has a distribution defined by
G(b) = 1 -  [1 -  F1(b)][l -  F2(6)], for b 6 [0; v2] (4)
2.2 Expected revenue for the seller from SP auc­
tions
2.3 Behavioural lemmas
Most of theoretical insights provided in MR rely on two behavioural 
lemmas which both require the following assumption on the buyers’ dis­
tributions of valuations.
Assumption A: For all v, l_  [Fifo)dv F2(v) > 0.
LI: Under Assumption A the more optimistic buyer bids less aggres­
sively — Lemma 3.1 in MR —.
L2: Under Assumption A the equilibrium bid distribution of the more 
optimistic buyer exhibits first order stochastic dominance over the 
bid distribution of the more pessimistic buyer — Lemma 3.2 in MR
2.4 Sufficient conditions for the ranking of auction  
institutions in terms of seller’s expected rev­
enue
The suggested ranking of auction institutions in terms of seller’s expected 




























































































Assumption B: For v 6 [0; v2], dv l  — F2(v)
SCI: I f Assumption A holds and if for all v and w such that for w > v
Fi(w) < F2(v) =*• F[(w) < F2(v)
then expected revenue is higher in FP auctions than in SP auctions 
— Proposition 3.6 in MR —
SC2: If Assumption A and B hold, if F\{-) is concave and if -
1 -  F2(v)
nondecreasing, then expected revenue is higher in the SP auctions 
than in FP auctions.
3 E xperim ental design
The experiment consisted of four sessions in each of which 12 subjects 
participated. All subjects were recruited from populations of undergrad­
uate students by means of public advertisement at the University of Bonn 
and were required to be inexperienced (i.e.: no previous participation in 
auction market experiments).
For all sessions, subjects reported to the experimental laboratory 
where written instructions were distributed and reviewed (see Appendix 
A). Once the key properties of the auction institution were explained 
and an example given, an introduction to the computer program and 
terminals’ features was provided. Subjects were then randomly assigned 
to a computer terminal. The experimental setting can be summarised as 
follows:
1. The distributions of valuations: The unique requirement on bid­
ders’ distributions to observe low-balling (Assumption A) can be satisfied 
with an appropriate set of uniform distributions. Since for FP auctions, 
both the equilibrium bidding strategies and the seller’s expected revenue 
have no analytical expressions, Maskin and Riley evaluated numerically 




























































































various asymmetric configurations. Two of these configurations, hence­
forth labelled Case 1 and Case 2, will be considered. In Case 1, a subject 
with values drawn from U[0;100] (henceforth called a subject of type 1) 
will compete with a subject of type 2, that is with values drawn from 
U[-100;100]. In Case 2, a subject of type 1 will compete with a bidder of 
type 3 whose values are drawn from U[-300; 100].
2. The matching procedure: Without further precisions, subjects 
were told that in each round they would be randomly matched with 
another participant. The cohort of 12 subjects in a given session was 
actually partitioned into 3 groups of 4 subjects from which the pairs 
of competitors were randomly drawn. Such a precaution allowed three 
statistically independent sets of observations to be obtained per session 
instead of only one. Also, for ease of comparison between FP and SP auc­
tion outcomes and in order to avoid sampling errors, both the matching 
of participants and the samples of valuations were kept constant across 
auction institutions.
3. The sequencing of competition environments: Subjects’ atten­
tion was drawn to the fact that each of them would alternatively and 
deterministically change type or competition environment in each trad­
ing period of the session. Due to the implicit presence of some learning- 
by-doing, this option was preferred to swapping bidders’ types after they 
had played in the same configuration for more then one round, in which 
case they would transfer their knowledge to the new competition en­
vironment and thereby biasing the data. The other alternative would 
have been to keep bidders’ types constant during the whole session, in 
which case the resulting disparities in subjects’ profits could yield some 
of them to adopt odd end-of-session behaviours. To prevent subjects 
possibly being confused by the constant change of bidding configuration, 
types were assimilated to colors and in each round, both subjects’ ranges 
of valuations were displayed.
4. The starting capital balance (SCB): Since subjects were allowed 
to submit any integer bid between 0 and 100, they were permitted to bid 
above their valuation. For inexperienced subjects, bidding above one’s 




























































































strategy to bid exactly one’s valuation is not necessarily (or at least 
immediately) perceived. A drawback of allowing subjects to do so is that 
they may incur losses if they win. Each subject was therefore granted a 
small initial capital balance in order to permit him to suffer losses in one 
or two rounds and told that if his net balance dropped below zero at any 
time during the experiment, he was no longer permitted to participate.
5. The information feedback: At the end of each trading period, all 
terminal screens displayed the outcome of that particular round. Each 
subject was privately informed whether he had won or lost, the profit 
made in that round, the opponent’s bid as well as both players’ types. 
This information was then appended to a ‘history window’ that could 
be retrieved at any time during the session. The alternative of providing 
subjects with full information feedback (i.e.: opponent’s value, bid, profit 
and identity) could have yielded undesirable supergame effects and/or 
mimicking of opponent’s strategy and was therefore discarded here.
4 E xperim ental results
4.1 Expected revenue and efficiency comparisons
Tables 1 and 2 report some statistics describing the observed expected 
revenues for the seller in FP and SP auctions for the 6 groups of sub­
jects and both competition environments. Although the expected selling 
prices from SP auctions are slightly above their theoretical predictions 
(i.e.: 16.66 for Case 1 and 8.33 for Case 2), they all remain close to 
the sample average of the second highest valuation E(X^2))- In order to 
check whether the observed and theoretical distributions of prices in SP 
auctions agree or not, Tables 1 and 2 show the results of a two-tailed 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S). The null hypothesis that the observed 
distribution of expected revenue Rsp(b) is equal to Eq. 4 was accepted 
for all groups and in both asymmetric cases2.
2It is worth noting th a t most sample distributions of selling prices and bids ex­
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Mean
(s.d.)“





































































(s.d.): S tandard deviation of expected revenue. Med.: Median 
b: Two-tailed K-S test.
Ho : Rsp(b) = R ^ hP(b) against H x : R Sp ( b ) ^ R Ts hP(b). 
c: One-tailed M-W test (z: unit normal deviate).
H 0 : Rpp(b) = R sp(b)  against Hi : R p p(b )< R sp(b ) .  
d: One-tailed two-sample K-S test.
Ho : RFp(b) =  Rsp(b)  against Hi : RFp(b)< R sp(b) .  
e: Average difference between observed prices in SP and FP  auctions:
S = p ap ~Pfp-
*: Reject Ho at significance level: p <  0.05.
°: Reject Ho against Hi : RFp{b)>Rsp{b)  a t significance level: p< 0 .05 . 
+ : Reject Ho : <5 =  0 against Hi : 6 > 0  a t significance level: p< 0 .05 .




























































































Table 2: Expected Revenues Comparisons (Case 2).
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To proceed with a ranking of auction institutions in terms of ex­
pected selling prices it may first be observed that there is no evidence 
that these are smaller in FP auctions than in SP auctions. By means of a 
one-tailed Mann-Whitney (M-W) test of the hypothesis that price series 
obtained from FP and SP auctions are stochastically equivalent, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected in favour of the alternative that selling prices 
are stochastically larger in FP than in SP auctions for most groups and 
in the aggregate. Results of a similar one-tailed two-sample K-S test 
cross-check and confirm this tendency.
Hence, on the basis of 396 observations per case, our data rejected 
MR’s theoretical predictions that FP auctions yield smaller expected rev­
enues to the seller than SP auctions* 3. Table 3 displays two measures of
proscribing the usual battery  of param etric tests. Appropriate t-tests will however be 
performed and reported when samples have Gaussian distributions.
3Numerical simulations revealed th a t expected revenues were 13% smaller in FP 




























































































Table 3: Pareto-Optimality of Allocations
Case 1 Case 2
S P S B F P S B S P S B F P S B
Group M.E.“ %{POA]h M.E. %[POA\ M.E. %[POA) M.E. %[POA]
1 96 90.3 94 84.7 100 100 96.1 93.1
2 98.4 91.7 96.2 90.3 99.3 97.2 97.7 93.1
3 97.1 93.1 95.8 87.5 98.7 98.6 96.5 94.4
4 97.9 88.3 91.4 80 94.7 90 96 93.3
5 97.2 90 94.9 85 99.8 98.3 95.5 90
6 99.7 95 93.5 78.3 100 100 94.2 81.7
All 97.7 91.4 94.4 84.6 98.8 97.5 96.1 91.2
Mean Efficiency.
b: Percentage of Pareto-O ptim al Allocations.
efficiency of allocations in SP and FP auctions. If W  stands for the win­
ner’s valuation and if V  represents the highest value between the two 
competitors, Cox et al. [1982] measure the efficiency of an allocation by 
the ratio 10yW. An allocation is said to be Pareto-optimal if the ratio 
equals 100. Any efficiency level below 100 characterizes unrealized gains 
from trade. Table 3 reports the mean efficiency for each group of sub­
jects as well as the percentage of Pareto-optimal allocations among all 
auctions. As always observed in previous symmetric auction experiments 
(Cox et al. [1982], Harstad [1993] and Kagel [1993]), the SP institution 
appeared to be more efficient than the FP one, and this for both asym­
metric settings.
4.2 Cumulative distributions of bids in FP auctions
According to Lemma LI, it should be observed that for equal valuations, 
subjects of type 1 in Case 1 submit lower bids than those of type 2 (and 
similarly for subjects of type 1 and 3 in Case 2). For each group and 
type i of subjects, Table 4 shows the average relative difference Si be­




























































































Table 4: Comparisons of Cumulative Distribution of Bids in FP auctions.










































































































®: One-tailed K-S test. Ho : Gi(b) =  G2(b) against Hi : G\(b) < Gi(b). 
b: S tandard deviation of Si =  (vt — bi)/v,. 
c: One-tailed f-test. Ho : <?i = 6 2  against Hi : Si > 62- 
d: One-tailed K-S test. Ho : J n (S )  = J 2i(S) against Hi : Jn (S )  <  J 2i(S). 
e: Number of trading periods where subjects of type /  1 received positive 
values.




























































































observe that S\ > S2 in Case 1 and <$j > 63 in Case 2. This is confirmed 
by means of a K-S test (D) on the distributions J,j(6) of Si in Case j  
which shows that M S )  < J2i(S) and J\2(S) < J32(S) at both aggregate 
and group levels.
Furthermore, since subjects of type 1 (type 2) in Case 1 are in a clearly 
different competition environment than those of type 1 (type 3) in Case 
2, distinct bidding behaviours should then be observed. From the plots 
of theoretical bidding functions in Figure 1 we see that for equal values 
i) subjects of type 1 submit lower bids when they are in Case 2 than 
when being in Case 1 and ii) subjects of type 3 submit lower bids than 
those of type 2. Hence we should observe that 6\ in Case 1 is greater 
than in Case 2 or equivalently that Jn(S) > J\2{S) and that S2 < S3 
or J2\(S) > J32(S). Results of a K-S test performed on the observed dis­
tributions indicates that subjects did adopt distinct bidding behaviours 
and in accordance with MR’s theoretical predictions.
From Lemma L2, in each asymmetric case the bid distributions of 
subjects of type 1, Gi(b), stochastically dominate those of their competi­
tors: G2(b) in Case 1 or G3(b) in Case 2. Table 4 shows the results of a 
one-tailed K-S test (T). The null hypothesis that G\(b) = G2(b) in Case 
1 and Gi(b) =  G3(b) in Case 2 can be rejected in favour of the alternative 
that bids submitted by subjects of type 1 are stochastically larger than 
those submitted by their respective competitor (type 2 or 3).
4.3 Bidding behaviours in SP and FP auctions
4.3.1 Second-Price auctions
As often observed in SP auction experiments (Harstad[1993], Kagel [1993] 
Kagel et al. [1987] and Kagel and Levin [1993]), subjects did not nec­
essarily adopt the dominant strategy when bidding. Only about 50% of 
all bids were equal to subjects’ valuations (and about 40% were above). 
This figure is relatively large when compared to the 30% reported by 
Kagel and Levin [1993] for a set of symmetric SP private-independent 




























































































Table 5: Relative Deviations from Dominant Strategy in SP auctions.
Case 1 Case 2 K-S
Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 3
Di2b
[D’n]0















































































































































Mean of relative deviations from dominant strategy: d = (b, — u,-)/u,. 
b: Two-tailed two-sample K-S test.
Ho : (d )=  ^ 2(d) against H i : ¥i(<f)?^2(<Q>
c: Two-tailed two-sample K-S test on non-zero deviations (d^O).
H 0 : * ](d ) =  4-2*(<i) against Hi : tf ] (d ) /4 < 2*(<f). 
d: Number of trading periods where subjects of type i ^  1 received positive 
values.
* : Reject the null hypothesis th a t d<  0 in favour of the alternative that 
d > 0. (binomial test on non-zero deviations)




























































































game is considerably simplified when there are only 2 competitors, there 
is an important difference in the experimental designs that strengthens 
the appearance that the dominant strategy is more easily adopted when 
there are only 2 competitors (even though these are asymmetric): sub­
jects in this experiment were not provided with full information feedback 
as they were in Kagel and Levin [1993] (i.e.: all competitors’ bids and 
valuations), so that no mimicking of opponent’s bidding strategy was 
possible.
For each group and asymmetric setting, Table 5 displays some 
statistics on the relative deviations from the dominant strategy,
[bid] - [valuation]
[valuation]
Since optimal bidding in SP auctions is insensible to asymmetries in 
bidders’ distributions of valuations, these relative deviations should thus 
theoretically be equal to 0 and remain constant through competition 
environments.
A binomial test on non-zero deviations (d ̂  0) shows that should a 
bidder deviate from his dominant strategy he is more likely to bid above 
his valuation than below. For symmetric SP auctions, Harstad [1993] at­
tributes the presence of overbidding to the combined effects of subjects’ 
misunderstanding of the selling procedure and the weakness of learning 
feedback mecanisms that would correct for this pattern. Both of these 
effects were readily perceived in this experiment. First, from informal 
discussions with participants at the end of SP sessions, it appeared that 
most of them established a trade-off between i) increasing the probabil­
ity of winning by overbidding and ii) decreasing the probability of losing 
money by submitting bids not too much above their values. This trade­
off in terms of probabilities seemed to be preferred to the straightforward 
questioning of what is the gain from overbidding and winning the auc­
tion as compared to bidding one’s valuation. Second, an analysis of the 
overbidding pattern illustrates well the weakness of learning feedback 
mechanisms in this auction institution: when bidding above ones valua­




























































































a positive profit (respectively, 0.107 and 0.648 in Case 1 and 0.037 and
0. 775 in Case 2).
A set of K-S two-sample tests — in Table 5 — checks further­
more whether the distribution of relative deviations for subjects of type
1, 'l'.(d), differs or not from \fy(d). Since in the aggregate, the null hy­
pothesis that (according to theory) 'l’i(d) = 'bj(d) has only been accepted 
when 'l'i(d) in Case 1 was compared with 'l'i(d) in Case 2, it appears that 
the observed distributions of relative deviations did significantly change 
as bidders swapped types. Results of similar K-S 2-sample tests — D{j 
— on the aggregate distributions of non-zero deviations, 'l'j(d), also indi­
cate that there are no significant changes in subjects’ out-of-equilibrium 
behaviours when they change type. The discrepancies in terms of sig­
nificance between Dij and Dtj are then due to various proportions of 
zero deviations in ^.(d) and 'Lj(d)4. Despite the relatively higher rate 
of equilibrium bids reported here, these deviations are not as well orga­
nized as those observed in Kagel and Levin [1993] where a significant 
decrease in overbids occurred as the number of bidders increased from 5 
to 10 in symmetric SP experiments. These misbehaviours illustrate well 
participants’ difficulties in understanding SP auction selling rules.
Convergence to the dominant strategy across trading periods has 
however been observed. A core of 5 subjects adopted the dominant strat­
egy within ten rounds and 6 others did so within forty. No particular 
bidding behaviour has further been observed: some of the remaining 
participants converged to the dominant strategy only by the end of the 
session while others continued to overbid.
4 Among all bids, 50% of those subm itted by subjects of type 2 or 3 were equal 
to  subject’s valuation and for subjects of type 1 in Case 1 and in Case 2, these 
percentages were respectively equal to 46.2% and 47.5%. Also, since most rejections 
of the null hypothesis th a t = 4’j(d) were observed in Groups 2 and 3, K-S
tests were performed on the aggregate data  of Groups 1, 4, 5 and 6. We observed: 




























































































Table 6: Relative Deviations from Equilibrium in FP auctions.
Case 1 Case 2 K-S









































































































0.18* 0.12* 0.35* 0.1
B: Mean of relative deviations from the equilibrium strategy !<*(.): 
d = ( b i -  b*(vi))/vi.
b: One-tailed K-S test. H 0 : Gi(b) = G f l‘(b) against Hi : G\(b) <  G j h(b). 
*: Reject Ho : d < 0 against Hi : d > 0. (binomial test).





























































































As Table 5, Table 6 reports statistics on subjects’ relative deviations from 
their respective equilibrium bidding strategy &*(.)
j  _  [bid] -  b*(v)
[valuation]
As mentioned earlier, optimal bidding strategies in these FP auc­
tions represent the backbone of the revenue ranking suggested in MR so 
that special attention is focused on them.
Results of a binomial test show that these deviations are signifi­
cantly positive for both cases in the aggregate. At the group level, signif­
icant overbidding (i.e.: bidding above &*(.)) appears to be more present 
in Case 2 than in Case 1. Since the binomial test does not take into 
account the deviations’ magnitudes in its statistic, a one-tailed K-S test 
on the observed distributions of bids when subjects axe of type i, G,(.) 
would shed additional light on the subjects’ behaviour. The results of 
this test indicate first that if not equal to their theoretical distributions 
G jh(.), empirical distributions are stochastically greater and second, that 
overbidding was relatively more present when subjects were of type 1 in 
either asymmetric case5.
Tables 7 and 8 report a non-parametric (Spearman) correlation 
analysis between absolute relative deviations from equilibrium — |d| — 
and valuations. A negative correlation coefficient — pv — indicates that 
the higher a subject’s valuation the less important is his absolute relative 
deviation from equilibrium. Since overbidding has been observed, most 
of these absolute deviations will thus be positive so that a significant pv 
would actually reveal whether low-balling is lacking when subjects have 
high valuations (pv > 0) or low valuations (pv < 0)6.
5One exception occurred for Group 5 in Case 1, where the opposite has been 
observed: D + =  0.17; so th a t G f h(b) <  Gi(6).
6Over all bids, 67.2% in Case 1 and 74% in Case 2 were above their theoretical 





























































































Table 7: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Deviations: Valuations.
— Case 1 —
Type 1 Type 2
Group
Pv # [< 0 ]“




































Number of subjects who displayed a  negative pv.
6: Number of subjects w ith negative pv a t significance 
level p < 0.05. A j indicates that exactly one of 
them  had a negative coefficient significant at 
p< 0 .1 .




























































































Table 8: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Deviations: Valuations.
— Case 2 —
Type 1 Type 3
Group
Pv # M 1
(# )




































We observe that all groups with significant correlations display neg­
ative coefficients and that these are mainly observed when subjects are 
of type 2 (or 3 in the aggregate).
Although coefficients are not significant when subjects are of type 
1 at the group level, individuals with a significant coefficient are more 
frequent when they are of type 1 than 2 or 3. We further note a clear 
tendency for bidders in Case 1 to deviate from equilibrium when val­
uations are low. On the other hand, subjects of type 1 in Case 2 are 
equally likely to have positive or negative significant correlation coeffi­
cients which is not surprising given that both the non-linearity and the 
support of their optimal bidding function are more demanding in terms 
of subject’s expected behaviour in Case 2 than in Case 1, and this for 
both high and low valuations.
The presence of overbidding in FP auction experiments has often 




























































































Table 9: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Deviations: Trading Peri­
ods.
Case 1 Case 2






Pr # M 1
(# )


































0.04 2 -0.11 1
6 0.08 2 0.23 1 -0.31 4 0.29 1
All -0.09** -0.2 -0.04 -0.09
Note'. Though not reported here, four subjects (one of type 1 in Case 1 
and three of type 2) had positive correlation coefficients at significance 
level p< 0 .05 .
perimental designs have been developed to explain this pattern (Cox et 
al. [1982][1985] and [1988]). Sharing straigthforwardly this risk aversion 
interpretation of overbids implicitly yields to assume that participants 
(even though ‘inexperienced’) act at equilibrium from the first trading 
period onwards or equivalently that there is no learning activity. Table 9 
shows the results of a correlation analysis between |d| and active trading 
periods (i.e.: periods where a subject had a positive valuation). A sig­
nificant negative coefficient pr indicates that deviations from equilibrium 
become smaller as experience grows7.
7It is worth noting here the im portance of using non-param etric correlation coef­
ficients when looking for relationships between variables th a t are a priori unknown: 




























































































It is notable that all significant coefficients are negative and are 
observed essentially in Case 1 at both individual and aggregate levels 
and for some subjects of type 1 in Case 2. For subjects of type 3, the 
overwhelming acceptance of the null hypothesis that observed and theo­
retical distributions of bids agree — see the statistics in Table 6 — 
explain the scarcity of significant correlation coefficients pr.
4.3.3 Implications of learning on MR’s revenue ranking
Having detected learning trends in both SP and FP auctions, we now 
reconsider expected revenues outcomes in Tables 10 and 11 when omitting 
the thirty earliest trading periods in each session.
According to the high rejection rate of the null hypothesis that 
the price series obtained from SP and FP auctions are identically dis­
tributed in favour of the alternative that those coming from FP auc­
tions are stochastically greater than those from SP auctions, there is no 
evidence of the superiority of SP auctions on FP auctions in terms of 
expected revenues as postulated in MR.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments designed to 
check whether MR’s theoretical predictions concerning a specific type of 
asymmetry among bidders in private-independent values auctions were 
verified. We see that the ranking in terms of the seller’s expected revenue 
of SP and FP auctions suggested by the authors is not verified on either 
a full-sample basis (i.e.: 396 observations) or, once a learning activity 
has been detected, on a sub-sample basis (i.e.: 216 observations).
In previous SP symmetric auction experiments, significant mod­
ifications in bidding behaviour occurred as the number of bidders in­
creased from 5 to 10. The outcomes of our SP auction sessions revealed
[1988], for example, looked for learning trends partially (i.e.: on a subset of all subjects 




























































































Table 10: Expected Revenues Comparisons for rounds > 30 (Case 1).






( #  Obs)
Mean
(s.d.)‘




































































(s.d.): S tandard deviation of expected revenue. Med.: Median 
b: Two-tailed K-S test.
Ho : R sp(b) = Rgp(b) against Hi : R Sp ( b ) ^ R Ts hP(b). 
c: One-tailed M-W test (z\ unit normal deviate).
Ho : RFp(b) = Rsp(b)  against Hi : R p p(b )< R sp(b ) .  
d: One-tailed two-sample K-S test.
H 0 : RFp(b) = Rsp(b) against Hi : RFp(b)<Rsp(b). 
e: Average difference between observed prices in SP and FP  auctions: 
b = Psp~Pfp-
*: Reject Ho a t significance level: p <  0.05.
°: Reject Ho against Hi : R fp (b )  >  Rsp(b)  a t significance level: p< 0 .05 . 
°°: Reject Ho against Hi : RFp(b) >  Rsp(b)  a t significance level: p < 0 .1 . 
+ : Reject Ho : <5 =  0 against Hi : 6 > 0  at significance level: p< 0 .05 .




























































































Table 11: Expected Revenues Comparisons for rounds > 30 (Case 2).






( #  Obs)
Mean
(s.d.)

































































that asymmetric subjects also significantly changed their strategies as 
their competitive environment varied. Given the relatively higher rate of 
equilibrium bids observed here (~50% instead of 30% in the above men­
tioned experiments), these variations in strategic behaviours show clear 
evidence of subjects’ difficulties in understanding the SP auction selling 
procedure.
Rejection of the dominance of the SP auction institution which 
theory suggests is due to the weakness of observed low-balling in FP 
auctions. This lack of low-balling occurred mainly when subjects received 
low values and persisted as their experience of the game grew. This can 
be understood as follows. What MR’s predictions are based on is a 
characterization of equilibrium. The difficulty here seems to have been 
for the subjects to ‘learn their way’ to such an equilibrium, this is to a 
situation in which they are all reacting optimally to each other.




























































































Second, it is worth noting that MR obtained optimal strategies 
numerically by means of a ‘tatonnement’ process aimed to define a max­
imum bid to be submitted by both competitors (b in Eq. 3) such that 
equilibrium bidding functions exist. If one were then to observe experi­
mental subjects acting and remaining at equilibrium, one might expect 
them to perceive the existence of that common ceiling on bids. From 
informal end-of-session discussions with participants, it appeared on one 
the hand that most comments were related to the implication of Lemma 
LI but none of them mentioned the problem of a common ceiling. On 
the other hand, it should be pointed that even if they had noticed this 
common maximum bid subtlety, subjects’ task of submitting equilibrium 
bids would then be considerably more difficult since they would then need 
to learn to agree on an unknown parameter. At this point, it has to be 
observed that the existing literature on interactive learning shows there 
is a fundamental problem with learning to coordinate on an equilibrium 
in non-cooperative games no matter how long a learning period allowed. 
Thus it is rather more likely that one will observe a variety of outcomes 
depending on subjects’ aspirations than that one would see MR’s exact 
predictions ever verified.
were consistent with results of Lemmas LI and L2, thereby showing that




























































































A Instructions for FP auctions
Set Up
Each of you will participate in 60 auctions.
In each auction you will be competing w ith one other participant for the purchase of 
a fictitious item.
In each auction, you will be randomly m atched w ith another participant.
Values
At the outset of each auction, a  value is random ly chosen for every bidder.
Each bidder will know his own value but not the value of his competitor.
The ranges from which values are drawn (with an equally likely chance) are known 
to both bidders.
Types
There are 3 different types of bidders: Red, Blue and Green.
1. Red-type bidders have their values drawn from the range [0;100],
2. Blue-type bidders have their values drawn from the range [-100;100j,
3. Green-type bidders have their values drawn from the range [-300; 100]. 
There are 2 possible matchings of bidders:
1. Red versus Blue,
2. Red versus Green.
Each of you will alternatively be in one of the 4 following situations:
1. You are Red and your competitor is Blue,
2. You are Blue and your competitor is Red,
3. You are Red and your competitor is Green,
4. You are Green and your competitor is Red.
Bids




























































































If your value is positive, you will be asked to  subm it a  bid.
Any integer bid tha t ranges from 0 to 100 will be accepted.
Awards
If only one of the bidders was allowed to  subm it a  bid, he will be awarded the item.
If both  bidders were allowed to  subm it bids, the bidder w ith the higher bid will be 
awarded the item.
If bo th  bidders subm itted the same bid, one of them  will be random ly chosen (with 
probability of one half) to  be awarded the item.
The bidder who is awarded the item  will be called the buyer.
Gains and Losses
If you are the buyer, you will pay a price equal to  your bid.
Only the buyer can make a gain or a loss.
The gain or loss of the buyer is equal to his value minus his bid.
Payoffs
All values, bids, prices, profits and losses refer to Crowns.
Each of you will be given an initial capital balance of 100 Crowns.
Your to tal profit of the game is equal to  the sum of your gains and your capital 
balance minus your losses.
If ever your current to tal profit falls below zero during the experiment, you will no 
longer be allowed to participate in the game.

































































































80 Case 1, Type 2
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